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Constitutional Law--Snepp v. United States--Short Shrift for
the Prior Restraint Doctrine
Like other government agencies charged with protecting national secur-
ity, the United States Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") has typically re-
quired employees to covenant against publishing information gained during
employment. Because CIA officers deal with extremely sensitive security and
foreign policy information, the agency has traditionally conditioned employ-
ment on a promise to seek prior clearance of publications about CIA and intel-
ligence activities.' Snepp v. UnitedStates2 is a unique case upholding this type
of employment contract. There, the United States Supreme Court summarily
imposed a constructive trust on profits from a former CIA officer's book on the
agency's Vietnam activities, even though it apparently disclosed no classified
information, because the author had failed to seek the CIA's prior approval.
This unusual censorship case, raising numerous constitutional and legal ques-
tions, has sparked sharp public commentary3 and received congressional at-
tention.4
Frank W. Snepp III ("Snepp") signed an oath when he joined the CIA in
1968, promising never to "publish ... any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either during or
after ... [his] employment . . . without specific prior approval by the
Agency."'5 Snepp had worked as the CIA's Chief Strategy Analyst in Viet-
nam, and witnessed Saigon's fall in 1975. He disapproved of CIA and United
States government policies there, particularly the disorganized and hasty
American withdrawal, and the failure to evacuate Vietnamese employees and
friends. Snepp tried, but failed, to effect an official report on the withdrawal;
then, just after signing a "termination secrecy agreement," he resigned from
the agency in January 1976.6
In November 1977, Snepp secretly published Decent Interval, a highly
critical "insider's account of Saigon's indecent end."7 Despite contrary indica-
tions to CIA officials, he did not seek the agency's clearance prior to publica-
1. Apparently in response to the decision in United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), the CIA has changed the wording of its secrecy agreement
from a broad inclusion of all information gained during employment to only classified informa-
tion. Compare Snepp's 1968 entering agreement, 444 U.S. 507, 508 (1980), with his 1976 departing
agreement id. at 508 n.l.
2. 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam).
3. Among articles and columns commenting on the decision are Levin, The High Court
Taxes Free Speech, NEw REPUBLIC, March 22, 1980, at 18; Jacobs, The CIA Needs More Than
Glue, Washington Post, April 15, 1980; Lewis, Kissinger, Snepp Illustrate Double Standard, Ra-
leigh News & Observer, June 10, 1980, at 4 (irony of Kissinger publishing classMed secrets un-
scathed, while Snepp punished for publishing unclassified material); McGrory, Court Stands
Foursquare for Privilege, Washington Star, March 16, 1980.
4. Committees in both houses have produced bills regulating executive agency employment
agreements.
5. 444 U.S. at 508.
6. Id. at 508 n.l.
7. F. SNEPP, DECENT INTERVAL (1977) (title page).
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tion.8 Government lawyers, although admitting that the book contained no
classified information, promptly asked the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin other publications and grant the CIA
damages for Snepp's breach.9 The court, after trial without a jury, upheld the
secrecy agreements.' 0 It imposed a constructive trust on Snepp's profits, and
forbade him from again publishing about the CIA without the agency's prior
approval." On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the deci-
sion, but concluded that compensatory and punitive damages at law, not the
equitable constructive trust, were appropriate remedies.' 2
The United States Supreme Court granted both Snepp's petition for certi-
orari and the government's conditional cross-petition, then summarily dis-
posed of the case in a per curiam opinion. 13 The Court found that Snepp had
breached a high degree of trust arising from both the contract and his special
position. It reinstated the district court's judgment and its constructive trust
remedy, and found equitable relief appropriate because of Snepp's fiduciary
breach. It termed this "swift and sure" remedy "tailored to deter" and a "nat-
ural and customary consequence of a breach of trust."'14 The Court rejected
nominal and compensatory damages as inadequate and punitive damages as
impractical and too "speculative and unusual."' 5 Justice Stevens dissented
strongly, arguing that Snepp breached no fiduciary duty because he had dis-
closed no confidential information. He characterized the agreement as an
abuseable prior restraint, 16 and criticized the Court's summary disposition of
the case without briefs or argument. 17
Historically courts have approved of narrowly drawn employment agree-
ments, and considering that most common employment contracts contain cov-
enants not to compete, have developed and applied widely accepted standards.
A landmark case, Mitchel v. Reynolds,' 8 required that covenants not to com-
pete meet a "rule of reason."19 The rule demands the covenants be reasonably
necessary to protect the employer's legitimate interest, and of the minimum
necessary duration and scope.20
Courts considering breaches of agreements respecting corporate trade
8. In a meeting with CIA Director Stansfield Turner, Snepp had indicated he would seek
review. But actually he had concluded that "if the CIA could officially leak to the press to white-
wash its role in Vietnam, it had forfeited the right to censor me in the name of security or national
interest." Id. at 577.
9. 456 F. Supp. 176, 182 (E.D. Va. 1978), aft'd, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 444 U.S.
507 (1980).
10. Id. at 179.
11. Id. at 182.
12. 595 F.2d 926, 937-38 (4th Cir. 1979) rey'd, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
13. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
14. Id. at 515.
15. Id. at 514.
16. Id. at 525-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 524-25.
18. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
19. Id. at 349-51.
20. See 444 U.S. at 519 nn.7 & 8 (interpretive cases).
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secrets and confidential information, however, unlike those presented with
competition covenants, have not applied the "rule of reason." Instead, they
have conclusively presumed that competitive use of trade secrets and confiden-
tial information is unreasonable. In Sperry Rand Corp. v. A-T-0, Inc.,2 1 for
example, company engineers agreed in writing not to divulge secret informa-
tion, then misappropriated company secrets and bidding data. The appellate
court affirmed the order for injunctive relief lasting two years, plus money
damages equalling the employer's loss.22 In Structural Dynamics Research
Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp.,23 former technical employees
used confidential computer program information despite written nondisclo-
sure agreements. The district court interpreted the contracts, which reached
"privileged, proprietary and confidential" information,24 as imposing broad
agency duties, and concluded that confidential information fell within the
agreement.25 Similarly, in Schwayder Chemical Metallurgy Corp. v. Baum,26
the court found that a company's former business manager, who had signed a
secrecy agreement, had breached his fiduciary duty by removing confidential
material.27
Cases have also consistently recognized an implied fiduciary duty respect-
ing confidential information gained during employment. In T7apek v. Chevron
Oil Co.,28 a geologist profited by using both his unique theory and informa-
tion produced during employment. The court determined that the theory fell
within the employee's fiduciary obligation, despite the absence of an express
contract or a finding that it was a trade secret. 29 Similarly, in Hunter v. Shell
Oil Co ,30 a company geologist profited by supplying an outsider with confi-
dential information about mineral interests. The court found that the fiduci-
ary relation demanded utmost good faith, and imposed a constructive trust on
the profits.3 '
Government employees, particularly those in the military and national
security areas, have long been subject to restrictions on their first amendment
rights. Most cases in the field, however, have considered only legislative or
administrative, rather than contractual, limitations. Beginning in 1947 the
Supreme Court, in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,32 concluded that regu-
21. 447 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1971).
22. Id. at 1392-93.
23. 401 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
24. Id. at 1114.
25. Id. at 1113-14.
26. 45 Mich. App. 220, 206 N.W.2d 484 (1973).
27. The court, however, awarded no damages and remanded the case because the plaintiff
failed to account precisely for its losses. .d. at 225, 206 N.W.2d at 487. The opinion did not
explore what effect the written agreement had on the fiduciary relation, or expressly conclude that
the fiduciary relation arose solely from the employment, not the contract.
28. 407 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1969).
29. Id. at 1134.
30. 198 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1952). A company rule, not an agreement, was the basis for the
obligation in Hunter. Id. at 487.
31. Id. at 487-89.
32. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
1981]
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lating expression of federal employees, even when it curtailed first amendment
freedoms, was permissible when the limited activity is "reasonably deemed by
Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service."'33 As applied in
later cases, that standard has allowed the government to require employees to
surrender constitutional rights when reasonably necessary to protect important
government interests.34
The Supreme Court has consistently allowed restrictions on expression of
military personnel when the activity threatens interference with military effec-
tiveness. 35 In Parker v. Levy 3 6 the Court upheld a military officer's conviction
for publicly urging black soldiers to refuse duty in Vietnam. The Court rea-
soned that the unique purpose of the military,37 a "specialized society," s38 de-
manded that military employees sometimes yield rights "to meet certain
overriding demands of discipline and duty."39 In 1980 the Supreme Court
applied this reasoning in Brown v. Glines,40 while upholding Air Force regula-
tions that required command approval before servicemen could circulate peti-
tions on base. The Court again found that special military requirements, such
as loyalty, morale, and discipline, were warranted by substantial government
33. Id. at 96-103.
34. Until the decision in Mitchell, the "right-privilege doctrine" had governed this area. That
doctrine, as expressed in McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892)
(Holmes, J.), provided that one "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. The Supreme Court expressly
rejected the doctrine in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). One case applying the
reasonableness standard is Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (approving state statute
that prohibited hiring teachers who advocated government overthrow). The Adler court deter-
mined that:
It is clear that such persons have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and
believe as they will. ... It is equally clear that they have no right to work for the State
. *. on their own terms .... They may work for the school system upon the reasonable
terms laid down by the proper authorities .... If they do not choose to work on such
terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. Has
the State thus deprived them of any right to free speech or assembly? We think not.
Id. at 492. Another case applying the reasonableness standard is Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968) (school board violated first amendment by dismissing teacher for letter criticizing
school board because no impairment of school system's efficiency resulted). In Pickering, the
Court recognized the problem of balancing "the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in comment-
ing upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568. See also United
States Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (statutory definition of "polit-
ical activity" not overbroad); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (state statute requiring
teacher to list organizational membership intrudes into fundamental liberty); Wieman v. Upde-
graff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (state loyalty oath concerning communist or subversive organization
membership created arbitrary class violating due process); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1947) (Hatch Act restricting government employee's political activity does not violate first
amendment); Note, The CIA and the First Amendment, 3 HASTINoS CONsT. L.Q. 1073, 1086-89
(1976).
35. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
36. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
37. Id. at 759 (quoting United States v. Priest, 21 C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 344
(1972)).
38. Id. at 743.
39. Id. at 744 (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953)).
40. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
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interests unrelated to suppression of free expression,41 and allowed the first
amendment infringement.
Although United States intelligence agencies have long required employ-
ees to promise prior clearance of publications as a condition of employment,
not until 1972 did a court first consider the practice's validity. In United States
v. Marchetti,42 the Fourth Circuit enforced a former CIA agent's signed se-
crecy agreement after he had published books containing classified informa-
tion. The court upheld the district court's conclusion that the narrowly drawn
contract did not create an impermissible prior restraint. It also acknowledged,
however, that it would "decline enforcement of the. . . oath. . . to the extent
that it purports to prevent disclosure of unclassified information, for, to that
extent, the oath would. . .[contravene]. . .First Amendment rights."'43
In deciding Snepp, the Supreme Court readily dismissed the threshold
question whether the employment contract satisfied the requirements typically
applied to employment agreements.44 It reasoned that a "body of private law
intended to preserve competition . . . simply has no bearing on a contract
made by the Director of the CIA in conformity with his statutory obligation
.... "45 This agreement, however, would certainly not have passed scrutiny
under the "rule of reason" laid down in Mitchel v. Reynolds46 because it lacks
reasonable time and geographical limits. The Court did not, however, elabo-
rate on why the contract's national security origins lifted it above the rules
governing other employment contracts. 47
Nor did the Court fully address the fundamental question whether the
separation of powers doctrine allowed the CIA, as an executive agency, to
erect a prior restraint system without express congressional authorization.48
Yet the Court has recognized the need for "express and appropriately limited
congressional authorization 49 of prior restraints in the executive branch. Jus-
41. Id. at 356-57. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (state prisoner's mail
censorship dos not violate first amendment when it furthers substantial government interests of
security, order, rehabilitation, and is no greater than necessary to further legitimate government
interest involved).
42. 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cer. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
43. Id. at 1317. See also Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied
421 U.S. 992 (1975) (reviewing and approving CIA's manuscript deletions).
44. Dissenting, Justice Stevens had argued that the contract's indefinite duration and scope
made it unenforceable under state law. 444 U.S. at 520 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See, e.g.,
Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assocs., 492 F.2d 279, 283 (4th Cir. 1974) (voiding
Virginia covenant lacking geographical limits); American Hot Rod Ass'n, Inc. v. Carrier, 500 F.2d
1269, 1279 (4th Cir. 1974) (voiding North Carolina covenant lacking geographical and time lim-
its); E.L. Conwell & Co. v. Gutberlet, 429 F.2d 527, 528 (4th Cir. 1970) (voiding Maryland cove-
nant).
45. 444 U.S. at 513 & n.9.
46. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
47. See Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, United States v. Snepp, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), at
3-7; Petitioner's Brief in Opposition to Writ of Certiorari, id., at 6-10.
48. Congress has authorized prior restraint, through injunction, of only one category of clas-
sified information, atomic secrets. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2280 (1976).
49. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 731 (per curiam) (White, J., concur-
ring). The concurrence noted that Congress had authorized some prior restraints against private
parties. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976) authorizes the National Labor Relations Board to issue
cease and desist orders against employers who threaten or coerce workers exercising protected
19811
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tice White, concurring in New York Times Co. v. United States,50 concluded
that absent congressional legislation, the executive and judicial branches lack-
ed the inherent power to issue remedies restraining publication.-' Instead, he
wrote, Congress intended them to rely on the deterrent effect of criminal sanc-
tions.52
Congress did, however, charge the CIA Director with responsibility for
"protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. '53
Broad construction of that mandate would allow the CIA's contractual prior
restraint. Important cases, however, have required that Congress delegate au-
thority to the executive branch only in explicit terms, especially where individ-
ual freedoms are involved.54 In Greene v. McElroy55 the Supreme Court
considered a Defense Department security program allowing summary dismis-
sal of employees. The Court struck down the program because no presidential
or congressional authorization expressly allowed agencies to fire employees
without due process safeguards.56 The Supreme Court in Snepp did not try to
reconcile the absence of delegated authority in Snepp with the standards estab-
lished in Greene.
rights; 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1976) enables the Federal Trade Commission to impose cease and desist
orders against unfair methods of competition. 403 U.S. at 731 n.1.
50. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
51. Id. at 732 (White, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 740. See id. at 718-19 (opinion of Justice Black); id. at 720, 722 (opinion of Justice
Douglas); id. at 742-47 (opinion of Justice Marshall).
53. 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976).
54. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 128-29 (1958) (statute did not authorize Secretary of State to
deny citizen's passport because of communist associations and beliefs). "Where activities or en-
joyment, natural and often necessary to the well-being of an American citizen. . . are involved,
we will construe narrowly all delegated powers that curtail or dilute them. Id. at 129. Absent
"such provision in explicit terms... the Secretary may not. . . restrict the citizen's right of free
movement." Id. at 130.
55. 360 U.S. 474 (1959): The program in Greene provided no opportunity for confrontation
or cross-examination.
56. The Court required clear proof
that the President or Congress,. . . specifically has decided that the imposed procedures
are necessary and warranted and has authorized their use. . . . Such decisions cannot
be assumed by acquiescence or non-action. . . . They must be made explicitly not only
to assure that individuals are not deprived of cherished rights under procedures not actu-
ally authorized. . . but also because explicit action. . . requires careful and purposeful
consideration by those responsible for . . . our laws. Without explicit action by
lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional import and effect would be relegated by
default to administrators who, under our system of government, are not endowed with
authority to decide them.
Id. at 507. See also Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 22-27 (1968) (Coast Guard regulation bar-
ring seaman belonging to "subversive" groups unjustified by validation statute, which must be
read narrowly to avoid interfering with first amendment freedoms); id. at 27-28 (Fortas, J., joined
by Stewart, J., concurring). In Greene the Court found that enabling and other statutes similar to
those in Snepp, while recognizing the existence of military secrets, were insufficient to authorize
the elaborate security program. 360 U.S. at 504. Three cases allowing prior restraints involved
legislatively imposed sanctions: Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972). Two others involved
military employees, Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); and bases, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976). See Petitioner's (Snepp's) Petition for Rehearing, Snepp v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1668
(1980), at 7 (denial of rehearing). While arguably the military's different history and character
distinguish it from the intelligence services, many of the same considerations apply to the CIA,
certainly a quasi-military agency sharing with the military the national security purpose.
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Perhaps most striking was the Court's easy treatment of the case's hardest
question: Did Snepp's contract, even though voluntary, impose an impermis-
sible prior restraint on protected speech?57 The Court dismissed this issue in a
footnote5 8 It reasoned that the voluntary agreement was a reasonable, "en-
tirely appropriate," exercise of the CIA's mandate to protect sources and
methods.59 The Court did not balance Snepp's interest in free expression
against the CIA's security needs, as do many courts considering censorship. 60
Nor did it consider the problem of overbreadth raised by the Marchetti court,
which had determined that prior restraints on unclassified information would
be unenforceable as overbroad infringements on first amendment freedoms.6 1
Since the Supreme Court's benchmark decision in Near v. Minnesota62 in
1931, only in "exceptional cases" 63 has the Court approved prior restraints,
repeating that "any system of prior restraints . . . bear[s] . . . a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity."'64 That concern guided the im-
portant decision in New York Times,65 in which the government had sought to
place its effort to block publication of classified documents concerning the Vi-
etnam War within a military security exception suggested in Near. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, deciding instead that the government
had failed to meet its heavy burden of demonstrating that the publication
would surely cause harm.66
Probably the first case using the national security exception to justify im-
posing prior restraint on publication was decided in 1979. In United States v.
57. 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
58. Id.
59. Id See 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) (1976). The court, drawing on Brown v. Glines, concluded
that even without a contract, the CIA could restrict employees' first amendment rights of expres-
sion to protect substantial government interests; arguably, the interests to be protected in Snepp
are national security secrets and the appearance of confidentiality. See 444 U.S. at 509 n.3.
60. See, ag., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v.
Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
61. 466 F.2d 1309, 1317 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
62. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
63. Id. at 716. Chief Justice Hughes gave three illustrations of "exceptional cases:" 1) war-
time restraints preventing disclosure of military actions; 2) enforcement of obscenity laws; 3) en-
forcing laws against incitement to violent acts or revolution. Id.
64. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Accord, Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-59 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971) (per curiam); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 992 (W.D. Wis.), appeal
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979); A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 61 (1975).
65. 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
66. Id. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (government required to show disclosure "must
inevitably, directly, and immediately cause... an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a
transport already at sea .... "); Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring) (must
show disclosure "will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or
its people"). See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 729-30 (1978). Other impor-
tant cases prohibiting prior restraints are Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (1976)
(court's 'gag' order prohibiting reporters from murder trial violated first amendment because pub-
licity's impact "was of necessity speculative, dealing . . . with factors unknown and unknow-
able.") Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal theatre board
members' refusal to allow "Hair" musical production violated first amendment); Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (injunction, to protect privacy, against neighborhood
leaflet distribution violated first amendment).
19811
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Progressive, Inc., 6 7 the United States District Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin temporarily restrained publication of an article about the hydrogen
bomb. The court determined that the article fell within the narrow national
security exception developed in Near68 because publication might allow a for-
eign nation to develop the atomic weapon more quickly.69 It distinguished
New York Times in three ways. First, it said that New York Times involved
only historical data.70 Second, in New York Times the government could not
suggest a good reason, beyond embarassment, why publication would harm
national security. 71 Third, federal statutes authorized restrictions on publish-
ing atomic data.72 The Progressive court concluded that the government, by
showing "grave, direct, immediate and irreparable harm to the United States,"
and indeed the world, had met its heavy burden.73
The Supreme Court's facile treatment of the prior restraint question in
Snepp contrasts sharply with the Progressive court's painstaking deliberation,
yet both cases upheld a prior restraint, a rare event in American judicial his-
tory. The restraint in Snepp differs from that in New York Times, the case
most factually similar to Snepp. Snepp's restraint originated in a voluntary
contract, not a judicial order. Also, the restraint arose in the executive branch.
But the subject matter at issue, Vietnam military history occurring at least two
years before, was strikingly similar. Unlike the proposed hydrogen bomb pub-
lication, no imminent danger, such as imperiling a transport already at sea
during wartime,74 was threatened in either case. In both cases, publication of
the material would, however, prove highly embarassing to the government.75
The Supreme Court, by focusing on the voluntary and contractual nature of
the restraint in Snepp, effectively ignored its own rules for evaluating prior
restraints.
Even though the Supreme Court perceived no contractual or constitu-
tional obstacles to enforcing some kind of restraint against Snepp, it did not
consider whether the CIA's censorship procedure met established standards
for censorship. Several cases evaluating school censorship of first amendment
67. 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.) (Warren, J.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
68. Id. at 996. The court reasoned that in modem times, publishing technical information
about the hydrogen bomb was analogous to publishing ship movements in wartime. Id.
69. Id. at 993-94.
70. Id. at 994. The events in New York Times had occurred between three and twenty years
before publication, although the Vietnam War continued.
71. Id.
72. Id. The Progressive court distinguished the dangers in New York Times by saying that
the information, "dealing with the most destructive weapon in the history of mankind... [could]
nullify the right to free speech and ... endanger the right to life itself." Id. at 995. The court
believed the case to be so difficult "because the consequences of error involve human life itself and
on such an awesome scale." Id. Judge Warren concluded that his issuance of an injunction
would "constitute the first instance of prior restraint against a publication in this fashion in the
history of this country.. ." but that it was justified because a mistaken ruling "could pave the
way for thermonuclear annihilation for us all." Id. at 996.
73. Id. at 996.
74. New York Times, Inc. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726-27 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
75. The critical nature of the book led Snepp to raise the defense of selective enforcement,
but none of the courts considering his case accepted the argument.
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materials, for example, have demanded "narrow, objective, and reasonable
standards" for judging material.76 In Baughman v. Frejenmuth,77 the court
considered school regulations prohibiting distribution of material that was
"libelous or obscne," or grossly insulting, or that advocated illegal action. It
declined to enforce the rules because they lacked time limits and precision.
The court perceived the "intolerable danger, in the context of prior restraint,
that under the guise of such vague labels [school officials] may unconstitution-
ally choke off criticism, either of themselves, or of school policies, which they
find disrespectful, tasteless, or offensive. That they may not to do."78 In
Snepp, however, the Supreme Court did not mention the absence of any ob-
jective criteria for CIA censorship, and ignored the question whether the con-
tractual restraint, though voluntary, suffered from overbreadth and violated
the first amendment.79
In part II of its opinion, the Court determined that the equitable construc-
tive trust was appropriate redress for Snepp's fiduciary breach. It found two
sources for Snepp's fiduciary duty: the contract itself, and the high degree of
implied trust arising from his unique employment.80 Citing the implied duty
allowed the Court effectively to bypass the question of the contract's constitu-
tional validity. According to the Court, this implied duty extended to both
classified information and any other information gained during Snepp's CIA
duty, whether secret or not. Yet the case's holding turned not on the actual
disclosure, but on Snepp's failure to seek clearance. This failure, not the pub-
76. Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1350 (4th Cir. 1973); See also Eisner v. Stam-
ford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 1971).
77. 478 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1973).
78. Id. at 1351. This was necessary so that those "enforcing the regulation are not given
impermissible power to judge the material on an ad hoc and subjective basis and that forbidden
activity be clearly delineated so as not to inhibit basic first amendment freedoms." Id at 1350.
See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (vague laws allowing arbitrary and
discriminatory application may inhibit "sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms"). See
also Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970) (public
criticism of school officials has positive value); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573-74
(1968) (matters of public interest and statements by public officials on public matters receive spe-
cial protection); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 1971) (rule allows
school authorities to suppress criticism of own actions and policies). The Baughman court con-
cluded that even precisely defined prior restraint systems required definitions of key terms, prompt
action on submissions, specific sanctions for delay, and a prompt appeals procedure. 478 F.2d at
1351.
79. See Ray v. Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (in FOIA suit seeking disclosure
ofplaintifi's CIA files, court concluded that "government officials who would not stoop to misrep-
resentation may reflect an inherent tendency to resist disclosure.... In Snepp, even though the
CIA admitted that numerous officers had not submitted articles, speeches, testimony and inter-
views for review, the Supreme Court lightly dismissed the issue of selective enforcement. Snepp
had relied on United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972) (reversing criminal con-
victions partly because of discriminatory enforcement against "unpopular" viewpoints). See also
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 828 (1974) (administrative restrictions on press interviews of pris-
oners must "operate in neutral fashion"); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (ordi-
nance allowing only labor picketing near schools violates Equal Protection Clause of fourteenth
amendment; government-imposed burdens on speech must be even-handedly applied: "govern-
ment may not grant. . . a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those
express[ing] less favored.. . views. Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based
on content alone, and may not be justified by content alone."
80. 444 U.S. at 510-11.
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lication, was the breach of trust.8 '
Focusing on the failure to seek clearance forced the Court to remove with
one hand what it had given with the other. The Court acknowledged "as a
general principle" Snepp's "right to publish unclassified information. '8 2 That
right should logically allow using only post-publication criminal sanctions to
achieve national security purposes. Instead, Snepp's contract and his implied
trust created a broad fiduciary duty that the court interpreted to range far
beyond the ordinary. Clearly that duty extended to national secrets.83 Less
clear is whether it also included all information gained during employment.84
The Court determined that finding a fiduciary breach was necessary and
essential to the equitable constructive trust remedy. The Court especially de-
sired this remedy, over those available at law, because it deters so cleanly and
completely. Under modem American rules, however, constructive trusts may
be freely imposed, whether or not a fiduciary breach or other event establish-
ing an equitable basis has occurred. American courts allow constructive trusts
whenever they seem appropriate. This contrasts with the English practice,
which requires an equitable basis.
The Supreme Court considered Snepp through an unusual and rather dis-
turbing procedure. It granted both Snepp's petition for certiorari and the gov-
ernment's conditional cross-petition,85 then summarily denied Snepp's claim
without having called for full briefing or having heard oral argument.8 6 Tech-
nically, the court did gain jurisdiction by granting Snepp's petition, contrary to
Justice Stevens's dissenting conclusion. But this procedure greatly prejudices
litigants, particularly the losing respondent, for it effectively denies the oppor-
tunity to be fully heard. This deprivation results in too few due process safe-
guards.87 Commentators have suggested that the summary per curiam
81. Id. The Court decided that publication, even of unclassified information, was harmful
because an individual officer lacked sufficient breadth of experience and knowledge to determine
what material, although unclassified, could actually jeopardize national security. Id. at 512.
82. Id. at 511.
83. The Court had buttressed its finding of a fiduciary breach by emphasizing that Snepp's
unreviewed book harmed national interests in two ways: by allowing an individual, not the
agency, to determine what material would expose sources and information, and by causing foreign
sources to lose confidence in the CIA's ability to keep secrets. Id. at 511-12.
84. Some authority does exist for the government's position that publication of all informa-
tion Snepp gained during his employment could be restricted by contract. There is also authority,
by analogy to cases forbidding personal profit from employment-gained information, that Snepp
could not profit from that information without prior clearance. This would be doubly so when the
information's publication would arguably jeopardize national security. The innumerable
memoirs of former government officials would negate this theory. See Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co.,
407 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir. 1969) (geologist who acquired oil locations, not otherwise publicly avail-
able, and profited from his theories developed during employment, became constructive trustee);
Essex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 214 Mass. 507, 102 N.E. 441 (1913) (newspaper reporter who through
job learned of employer's leasehold, then tried to sell it to employer at higher price, became con-
structive trustee because he acquired information as result of employment); 5 A. Scorr, THE LAW
oF TRusTs § 505 (2d ed. 1967).
85. 444 U.S. at 507. Dissenting, Justice Stevens concluded that the Court in essence
"grant[ed] the Government's petition while denying Snepp's." Id. at 524 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).87. The summary per curiam disposition of the Snepp case was one of 10 such summary
actions taken by the Court during its 1979-80 term. In all such cases the Court calls for the entire
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practice disadvantages both parties, who must submit only the briefest peti-
tions for certiorari and briefs in opposition. An alternative procedure has been
suggested whereby the Court would direct the parties to file full briefs to show
cause why the judgment below should or should not be reversed without oral
argument.88 The Court, in its 1980 rule revisions, however, firmly rejected
that alternative by proclaiming that "a summary disposition on the merits"
continues to be a viable possibility in any certiorari case.89
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Snepp was unusual for
both the Court's procedure and reasoning. The summary procedure indicated
that the Court was in no mood to undertake analysis of the prior restraint
doctrine in the context of a voluntary contract, or the issue of legislative dele-
gation of authority to the executive branch. Instead, the Court sought to hold
Snepp to his agreement, perhaps ultimately on the theory that one should
honor his promise. The Court considered Snepp's voluntary and knowing en-
try into the contract essential to its decision. Possibly the result would have
differed had the restriction originated in regulations or legislation. While the
decision was logical in what it did treat, it is regrettable for its many omissions.
Recent activity in Congress may soon correct one omission by granting intelli-
gence agencies statutory authority to impose some restraints on employees.
Even that legislation, however, must one day undergo the scrutiny so notice-
ably absent in Snefpp. A future Supreme Court, less intent on punishing one
who reneged on his promise, must still consider the important constitutional
questions raised, but not resolved, in Snepp.
LAURANCE DAVIDSON PLESS
record in the court below, if it is not already lodged with the Court, before proceeding to dispose
of the case in a summary fashion. Interview with Eugene Gressman, Professor of Law at Univer-
sity of North Carolina School of Law, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (March, 1980).
88. R. STEm & E. GRESSMAN, SUPRE.ME COURT PRACTICE § 5.12, at 364-65 (5th ed. 1978);
Brown, Foreward" Process of Law, 72 HAiv. L. REv. 77, 81-82 (1958).
89. See revised Rule 23.1, dealing with disposition of petitions for certiorari. At the same
time, revised Rules 21.4 and 22.2 admonish the parties to keep the petition for certiorari and the
brief in opposition "as short as possible." The revised rules are set forth in 48 U.S. L.W. 4339
(1980).
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